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The purpose of this thesis is to determine how and to what extent the Department of Defense
Value Engineering (VE) effort can be utilized to improve the procurement of spare parts. An in-depth
research effort was undertaken in this area. Interviews were conducted and data were collected from
the DOD, DLA, and Navy Supply Systems Command regarding this topic. A comparative analysis
of the data revealed trends and opportunities for VE application to the procurement of spare parts,
which resulted in three conclusions: First, VE is a proven cost saving tool but is underutilized in
spare parts procurement. To maximize savings, VE should be emphasized in the replenishment spare
parts process. DOD must initiate efforts to encourage more contractor VE participation in the spare
parts procurement process. Second, there continues to be a lack of top management support within
the DOD for VE as a whole, which directly impacts on VE investment in spare parts procurement.
An intensive training and education process is necessary for Government and contractor acquisition
personnel emphasizing the benefits of the VE program. The third conclusion is that the current DOD
procurement environment of reduced budgets and fewer major weapons acquisitions heightens the
need for greater use of VE in the spare procurement process. Proper use of the Value Engineering
program, in major systems acquisitions and spare parts procurement, possesses numerous
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding
of the Department of Defense Value Engineering (VE) program,
to what extent it is currently utilized, and how it can be
applied to the procurement of spare parts. This chapter
provides an overview addressing the reasons for applying VE to
spare parts procurement, the objective of this research, the
research questions to be addressed, the research scope, the
research methodology, and concludes with a brief description
of the organization of this study.
B. OVERVIEW
Value Engineering is basically an analysis and design for
cost savings. It is an attempt to achieve optimal value
without degrading from the quality or function of the required
end product. At this point it is important to distinguish
between what is meant by value and cost as they are two
distinctly different expressions. Value is defined as: (1)
the worth of a thing in money or goods at a certain time,
and/or (2) the utility of an item in directly or indirectly
satisfying a recognized need [Ref. 15: p. 23]. Cost is
defined as: (1) general usage: the amount of money or
equivalent incurred for supplies or services including profit
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or fee, and/or (2) in contracting: the amount of money or
equivalent paid for supplies or services exclusive of profit
or fee [Ref. 15: p. 191. The fundamental concept of Valuc
Engineering is to strive for maximum value in the desired ena
product while reducing costs.
In today's environment of ever decreasing budgets and
increasing costs, "right sizing" of our force structure,
public scrutiny of Government procurement practices, and
continued oversight and influence from Congress, acquisition
personnel must take aggressive action in any potential area
that can save billions of critical defense budget dollars.
For this reason it seems prudent that procurement personnel
take a well proven cost reducing tool, that of Value
Engineering, and ensure that it is being used to its fullest
and not limit it to its traditional role with the procurement
of new major weapon systems.
The many weapon systems utilized by the Department of
Defense (DOD) are supported by more than four million spare
parts and an expenditure of $22 billion in fiscal year (FY)
1984 [Ref. 44: p.5]. Spare parts are essential to maintaining
fully functional and operational equipment for combat ready
f&rces. They are procured to replace parts that are worn,
broken, or malfunctioning. The range of spare parts includes
inexpensive non-critical individual replacement parts, highly
critical and expensive parts, and subassemblies or large
components of supported end items.
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The media has over the years identified numerous problems
within the DOD procuremert process for spare parts, an example
being that of the $435 hammers and the like. As a result of
the "pricing horror stories" there has been a continual trend
in increased congressional oversight within our business.
This has lead to a recent reform effort into the procurement
of spares. On 25 July 1983, Secretary of Defense, Casper
Weinberger, issued a ten-point outline which was followed by
a twenty-five point plan of how the Military Departments
should proceed to correct the problems that existed in the
acquisition of spares. [Ref. 12:p. 101 This prompted each of
the Services to undertake actions, the Navy result was to
develop the Buy Our Spares Smart ("BOSS") program.
The spare parts procurement process is somewhat different
from that of major system acquisitions. Spares are generally
purchased in two phases to support a weapon system, the
"initial" spares and "replenishment" spares. These two phases
and processes will be explained in Chapter IV. This research
will identify how the efforts and goals of the-VE program can
be used to enhance the acquisition process of spare parts.
C, RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding
of how the Department of Defense Value Engineering program has
progressed throughout its thirty plus years, with an emphasis
on the Department of the Navy's efforts, the extent to which
3
it is currently used in the procurement of spare parts and how
VE can be applied to strengthen the acquisition process of
spare parts.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is derived from the above
stated research objective and asks: How and to what extent is
the Department of Defense's Value Engineering program
applicable to the procurement of spare parts, and how should
VE be utilized for maximum benefit?
The following subsidiary research questions were developed
to assist in answering the primary research question:
1. What are the principal features of the DOD's VE program?
2. To what extent is VE applied to spare parts procurement?
3. Which programs or areas are most successful in
implementing VE and why?
4. What characteristics of spare parts are most pertinent
to application of the VE concept?
5. What approach should DOD use in applying VE to spare
parts procurement?
E. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This thesis develops an understanding of the DOD's Value
Engineering program and how it is and can be more successfully
applied to the procurement of spare parts. The study focuses
on current utilization of VE efforts within the Department of
the Navy (DON), more specifically the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP). Both the DOD in-house and contractor value
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engineering programs are looked at and evaluated. Currently,
it appears that the majority of the VE effort applied to
spares procurement within the Navy is accomplished in the in-
house program [Ref. 51]. A look at what can be done to
improve and expand contractor participation in VE for spares
is addressed in both Chapters V and VI. It is assumed that
the reader of this study is somewhat familiar with acquisition
concepts and terminology as well as the basics in spare parts
procurement, avo-iding any need for great detail in either
area.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study involved
a comprehensive review of the available literature and
interviews with key value engineering personnel at the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Department of the Navy, i.e.,
NAVSUP, Aviation Supply Office (ASO), and Ships Parts Control
Center (SPCC). The literature research included a review of:
(1) Professional journals and periodicals; (2) Research
reports published by United States military postgraduate
schools; and, (3) United States Department of Defense
publications. The interviews conducted were informal and
structured around the guidelines provided by the questions
stated in Appendix A
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G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study provides an introduction into the background
history and development of the Department of Defense Value
Engineering program in Chapter II. Chapter III provides an
overview of the current DOD and Department of the Navy (DON)
VE program and policies. The spare parts procurement process
is explained in Chapter IV, identifying its uniaueness from
the major system acquisition process.
Some problems or issues surrounding the current DOD VE
procedures as well as successful application of VE are
examined in Chapter V to identify and link these VE
application successes with the procurement of spare parts.
Chapter VI presents conclusions drawn from this research as
well as recommendations to improve the implementation of the
Value Engineering process within spare parts acquisitions.
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF VALUE ENGINEERING
A. INTRODUCTION
What is Value Engineering? Gleaning trom the numerous
references, VE can be described in simple, layman's terms, as
an analysis and design process for cost savings, an attempt to
achieve optimum value without degrading from the quality or
function of the required end product. To develop a more
complete understanding of this extensive field of VE, this
chapter will first provide a definition of VE and give a brief
background on the history and development of Value
Engineering/Analysis.
In today's world of ever increasing costs, the rising
Federal deficit, public scrutiny of Government procurement
practices, and significantly reduced DOD budgets, it seems
prudent that we undertake aggressive action in any program
that can potentially save billions of dollars. It is not
uncommon to read examples of savings-to-cost ratios of 10:1,
20:1, even 100:1, for every dollar invested in the VE process.
For FY 1986, DOD reported $1.9 billion of in-house VE savings
against an investment of $58 million for a reported return on
investment (ROI) of $33 for every dollar invested [Ref. 32:
p.1]. Clearly, the Government cannot and should not overlook
any opportunity to save taxpayer dollars. The potential
7
savings that can be attained with a strong and well managed VE
program can be quite significant.
B. VALUE ENGINEERING DEFINED
Value Engineering is the term that the Government has
chosen to identify its program of Value Analysis, Value
Management or Value Improvement (terms often associaced with
business and industry). For the purpose of this research,
these terms will be considered synonymous. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines "Value Engineering" as:
An organized effort to analyze the functions of systems,
equipment, facilities, services and supplies for the
purpose of achieving the essential functions at the lowest
life cycle cost consistent with required performance,
reliability, quality and safety. [Ref. 46:p. 48-2]
The FAR definition reflects a systematic and objective
evaluation of a product's or service's function and its
related costs, often associated with price and cost analysis.
Value Engineering can be a relatively expensive and demanding
technique that may include analysis of the product's function,
present and anticipated future operating costs, alternative
approaches to the problem and their anticipated costs. For
relatively small dollar acquisitions, it also can be a brief
survey using questions like:
Can the product, or any part of it, be eliminated?
Can a standard part replace a special one?
Can a lower-cost product, material, or method be used?
Are paperwork requirements excessive or unreasonable?
Can parts be packaged more economically? [Ref. 45: p.2-1]
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DOD manuals and instructions provide Value Engineering
definitions which are quite similar to the FAR, with some
slight variations in wording or terminology. It must be
understood that VE applies to hardware and software;
development, production, and manufacturing specifications;
standards, contract requirements and other acquisition program
documentation; facilities design and construction; and
management or organizational systems and processes to improve
the resulting products [Ref. 29: p. 6-0-5].
The last few ords of the prior sentence are very
significant; "management or organizational systems and
processes to improve the resulting products." This relates to
the testimony of Mr. Alphonse J. Dell'Isola, Vice President of
Smith, Hinchmann & Grylls Associates, Inc., a well known Value
Engineering advocate since the 1960's. He defines Value
Engineering as:
Value Engineering basically is a management plan, an
organized approach, that dedicates time and effort towards
the realization of optimization of costs. .. -total costs,
and that includes the follow-on costs to run, staff,
maintain and operate. [Ref. 10: p. 71
He further states that optimizing costs without sacrificing
needed qualities or performance areas is essential. Mr.
Dell'Isola's concept of VE being a "management plan" is a
crucial element to ensuring any VE effort to be successful.
The need for and use of a management plan, this philosophy or
9
concept will be more fully developed in Chapters V and VI.
With a clear understanding of the definition of VE, the next
two sections will address the VE history and development and
DOD involvement in VE.
C. VALUE ENGINEERING HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
The methodology of Value Engineering within the DOD was
developed as a result of "Value Analysis" which was first
developed by the General Electric (G.E.) Corporation in 1947.
At this time Mr. Lawrence D. Miles, an engineer at G.E. was
asked to develop a method to improve product efficiency by
substituting less expensive materials which would still
perform necessary functions. He developed a common-sense
approach known as "Value Analysis" (VA), created to identify
unnecessary costs. He defined VA as:
A philosophy implemented by the use of a specific set of
techniques, a body of knowledge, and a group of learned
skills. It is an organized creative approach which has
for its purpose the efficient identification of
unnecessary cost, i.e., costs which provides neither
quality nor use nor life nor appearance nor customer
features. [Ref 18:p. 11
Mr. Miles further states that VA results in an orderly
utilization of alternative materials, newer processes, and
abilities of specialized suppliers. It focuses on one
objective, equivalent performance for lower costs; it provides
step-by-step procedures for accomplishing its objective
10
efficiently. The process he developed operates via three
basic steps:
1. Identify the function.
2. Evaluate the function by comparison.
3. Cause value alternatives to be developed.
[Ref. 18: p. 14]
It is important to note too that "Best Value" is determined by
two considerations: performance and cost [Ref. 18:p. 4]. Mr.
Miles also emphasized that you must recognize who contributes
to performance and value; "Each individual involved in
bringing forth a product contributes .... " [Ref. 18: p. 5].
This seems to follow nicely with today's changing environment
and the push for Total Quality Leadership/Management (TQL/M).
Mr. Miles developed five basic questions for uncovering
needed pertinent facts in his Value Analysis approach. They
are:
1. What is the item?
2. What does it cost?
3. What does it do?
4. What else would do the job?
5. What would the alternative cost? [Ref. 18: p. 18]
Answers to these questions would allow for the collection of
enough pertinent information to develop a sound base for a
decision to be made in regards to cost reduction. These
questions are of the same nature of those previously
mentioned, referenced in the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) "Desk Guide to Price and Cost Analysis". These
are simple questions and can be easily answered. yet have a
11
powerful impact when incorporated in a well-established
procedure or program for cost reduction.
D. DOD VI INVOLVEMENT
The DOD first became involved with Value Engineering in
the 1950's. In 1954 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ships adopted a
modified version of G.E.'s value analysis concept in an
attempt to reduce the cost of ships and related equipment. In
applying the concept, the Navy directed its efforts primarily
at cost avoidance during the initial engineering design stage
and called the program "Value Engineering" [Ref 4:p. 561].
Eventually due to the success of the VE program within the
Navy, the Army and Air Force were soon to follow suit. The
DOD formally established a VE program in 1962.
Since its inception and over its thirty year life, the VE
program has had its ups and downs. At the onset it seemed to
flourish as it was well supported by top management due to its
coincidence with then Secretary of Defense McNamara's cost
reduction program [Ref 19:p. 6]. In 1984 President Reagan's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control renewed interest in VE
throughout the DOD and in the Navy as well, where VE activity
was practically dead (Ref. 2:p. 4]. The lack of Navy support
for VE at that time is further exemplified by the GAO report
dated 27 September 1983, which states:
Value Engineering, a technique for reducing cost and
improving productivity, ... although increased savings have
been reported, Defense was still more than $300 million
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short of its fiscal 1982 savings goal. Navy lagged behind
the other services. [Ref. 42: p. 1]
Following these public criticisms of the Navy's efforts in VE,
there appeared to be a revitalization of the importance of
value engineering within the Navy which lead to the
implementation of a new VE effort. In 1986 the Navy
established a monetary goal of $365 million for certain
commands and the Marine Corps. The total savings reported for
1986 was $467 million, yet the audit report shows that only
$237 million are truly VE savings [Ref. 32: p.293. Value
Engineering applied to spare parts procurement has received
increased attention since the initiation of the 1983 Secretary
of Defense plan to improve acquisition in this area. The
Navy's focus has varied throughout the years depending
primarily on the political climate and top management support
at the time. The Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM),
PRICE FIGHTER Detachment, in Norfolk, Virginia, office has
assessed over 40,000 spare parts through the VE process since
1983 [Ref. 48]. Approximately 1600 spares are reviewed
annually for potential cost savings. Recently this office has
shifted to the use of the "should cost" or "could cost"
analysis process for spare parts. These two methods of spare
parts evaluation are distingiushed by their degree of
conservatism in establishing unit costs: "should cost"
analysis uses highly accurate historical data of an item, such
as direct material and labor costs, to arrive at a target unit
13
price for a spare part, i.e., a reasonable estimate of what
the item "should cost"; "could cost" analysis looks at what
technology is available and determines the most efficient
process or technique of manufacturing (not necessarily what is
currently being used) and determines what the item "could
cost". The Price Fighter Detachment programs continue to
generate large cost savings from these processes. The current
policies and regulations of the DOD/DON VE program will be
addressed in the next chapter.
14
III. CURRENT DOD VALUE ENGINEERING POLICY
A. DOD GUIDANCE
Before proceeding with an explanation of the current VE
policies, the following definitions are provided as a common
basis for understanding:
1. Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP). A change
proposal (a change in the contract, e.g., contract
modification) that is submitted by a contractor under a
value engineering incentive or program requirement clause
included in a Federal contract. [Ref. 47: p. 21
2. Value Engineering Proposal (VEP). A change proposal
developed by employees of Federal Government or contractor
VE personnel employed by the Government to provide VE
services for the contract or program. [Ref. 47: p. 2]
3. Acquisition Savings. Savings resulting from the
application of a VECP. Includes - instant contract
savings, concurrent contract savings and future contract
savings.
a. Instant Contract Savings. Net cost reductions
realized from the application of a VECP to a
contract, e.g., unit cost reductions
multiplied by the number of units affected,
less the contractor's allowable development
and implementation costs.
b. Concurrent Contract Savings. Net cost
reductions applicable to other contracts
ongoing at the time of VECP accepted.
c. Future Contract Savings. Net cost
reductions of affected units of future
contracts during the sharing period.
[Ref. 46: p. 48-1]
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4. Collateral Savings. Measurable net reductions
resulting from a VECP in the Agency's overall projected
collateral costs exclusive of acquisition savings.
[Ref. 46: p. 48-1]
5. Contractor's Development and Implementation Costs.
Those costs the contractor incurs on a VECP specifically in
developing, testing, preparing, and submitting the VECP, as
well as those costs required to implement the VECP as
required by Government acceptance of a VECP.
[Ref. 46: p. 48-1]
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-131
is the driving document which requires the use of Value
Engineering, as appropriate, by Federal Departments and
agencies to identify and reduce nonessential procurement
program costs. Published in 1988, it required that each
agency administrator establish and improve their VE efforts.
The OMB circular lead to the development of formal VE offices
and programs within the Department of Defense and its various
Services. Within the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) the
general responsibility for VE rests with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, ASD(P&L),
and more specifically with the Director -of Industrial
Engineering and Quality, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Production and Logistics, DASD (PR)IEQ . In the
Department of the Navy, general responsibility falls to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, ASN(RDA) and more specifically to the Deputy for
Acquisition Policy, Integrity, and Accountability, (Dep, APIA)
within the same ASN(RDA) office. [Ref. 29: p. 14-c-li
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The policy of OMB Circular No. A-131 required each of
these newly founded offices to tailor its VE efforts to their
respective mission and organizational structure. It
emphasized the need for adequate funding, thorough training of
personnel, proper management and monitoring of the VE program,
and required data collection for reporting and updating the
agencies' utilization of Value Engineering. It also
identified the fact that in most agencies, a relatively few
programs or projects comprise the majority of costs and value
engineering efforts should be concentrated on these programs
and projects [Ref. 47: p. 3]. The statement thus emphasized
that VE efforts should be directed at major system acquisition
programs and that is exactly where it went. To focus on the
use of VE we must first understand the major system
acquisition process.
The Department of Defense major system acquisition
procedure and policies were recently streamlined in February
1991. A basic understanding of these procedures and policies
is needed to fully appreciate the basis for VE in the major
systems acquisition process as well as the spare parts
procurement process. There are five major milestone decision
points and five phases of the acquisition process, illustrated
in Figure 1 on the following page. Prior to moving from one
phase to the next, the phase objectives and minimum required
accomplishments must be met, and proper approval received from
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Figure 1: Acquisition Phases and Milestones
Source: DODD 5000.2M Defense Acquisition Management Policies
and Procedures dated 23 February 1991.
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Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) USD(A). This process
of moving through the various phases and milestones can take
only a few months or many years depending on the program and
difficulties encountered along the way. It is in Phase II,
Engineering and Manufacturing Development where the VE process
is currently emphasized and executed. [Ref. 29: p.2-1]
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) pha
is when the program or project begins to fully develop and
take shape prior to full Production and Deployment. At this
point there is a move to efficiently and effectively integrate
the production engineering, producibility, and VE efforts so
that the system and its associated manufacturing processes can
be designed and developed concurrently. [Ref. 29: p. 6-0-1]
With this background understanding of the DOD acquisition
process, the next section will address the actual VE
techniques used in defense contracts.
B. CURRENT POLICY
As mentioned above, OMB Circular No. A-131 is the guiding
DOD document for Value Engineering efforts and application
(despite the fact that the circular has expired pursuant to a
sunset provision contained therein, it remains in effect as a
new and "more stringent" OMB circular is currently being
written and reviewed [Ref. 52]). The detailed policies and
procedures for implementing VE techniques in Government
contracts is found in Part 48 of the Federal Acquisition
19
Regulation (FAR). The specific clauses for inclusion in
contracts, identified as potential VE candidates and required
by law, are located in FAR Part 52, specifically clauses
52.248-1 and 52.248-2 for the incentive and mandatory VE
programs respectively. A VE clause is required to be included
in solicitations and contracts when the contract amount is
greater than $100,000 or of lesser value if identified by the
contracting officer as a potential for significant savings.
Five exemptions to this requirement are identified in the FAR,
they are:
1. For research and development other than full scale
development;
2. For engineering services from not-for-profit or
nonprofit organizations;
3. For personal services;
4. Providing for product or component improvement, unless
the VE incentive application is restricted to areas not
covered by provisions for product improvement;or
5. For commercial products that do not involve packaging
specifications or other special requirements or
specifications. [Ref. 46: p. 48-5].
C. THE VE PROGRAM AND PROCEDURES
The VE program consists of two distinct components: an
in-house effort and a contractor effort. The in-house effort
is directed at internal operations through VE studies.
Through this process Government employees are employed to
study potential VE areas and develop recommended improvements
to meet the VE objective of maintaining quality while seeking
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to reduce costs. Their efforts result in the creation and
submission of Value Engineering Proposals (VEPs). The
contractor component is directed to stimulate and entice
contractor submission of Value Engineering Change Proposals
(VECPs) to reduce costs, and nonessential requirements, while
maintaining quality and functional needs.
As noted briefly in the previous section, there are two
Value Engineering clause types identified in the FAR for the
contractor component: 1) An incentive approach using
voluntary participation, and 2) A mandatory program requiring
a specific VE effort by a contractor, where the Government
pays for the contractor's VE effort. Both forms of VE clauses
are unique in that they provide stimulus specifically designed
for cost reduction contract changes. They are intended to
foster a climate of cooperation and a win-win situation, where
the Government acquires savings and the contractor collects
increased profit dollars, as well as manage change to permit
the Government to acquire higher quality, lower-cost items.
The incentive method encourages the -contractor to
voluntarily submit VECPs using his own resources. The
"incentive" is a sharing arrangement of the savings realized
and payment of the contractor's allowable developmental and
implementation costs if the VECP is accepted [Ref 46:p. 48-2].
This VE "incentive" approach is typically used where there are
detailed drawings, specifications, or designs that the
contractor is working to [Ref. 8: p. 2]. The VECPs are
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received in a similar manner as unsolicited proposals and thus
require a thorough review.
The mandatory program requires the contractor to undertake
a specified level of VE effort in accordance with the
Government's program plan. When VECPs are accepted under this
program, the contractor shares in the savings but at a lower
percentage rate than that of the voluntary program. (Refer to
Table 1 on the following page for sharing ratios and
percentages) The primary objective of the mandatory program
is to ensure that the contractor's VE effort is applied to
areas of the contract that offer opportunities for
considerable savings. This type of VE program is used more
often when the work involves broad requirements, such as for
functional or performance specifications [Ref. 8: p.2]. It
should also be noted that the FAR specifically states that no
sharing is permitted in Architect-Engineer (A&E) Contracts
[Ref 46: p. 48-2].
As can be seen these sharing arrangements are dependent on
the type of contract that the VECP is submitted under as well
as the type of VE clause within the contract. The two general
categories of savings previously defined; 1) acquisition
savings, which includes instant, fuLure, and concurrent
savings, and 2) collateral savings, utilize the applicable
sharing ratios from Table 1 when determining the Government
and contractor sharing percentages.
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TABLE 1
GOVERNMENT/CONTRACTOR SHARES OF VECP SAVINGS
(All Figures are in Percentages)
VE INCENTIVE VE PROGRAM
(VOLUNTARY) REQUIREMENT
(MANDATORY)
CONTRACT TYPE Instant Future/ Instant Future/
Concurrent Concurrent
Fixed-Price 50/50 50/50 75/25 75/25
(other than
incentive)
Incentive 50/50 * 75/25
(fixed-price
or Cost)




• SAME AS THE SHARING RATIO IN THE CONTRACT
Source: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 48
The processing of Value Engineering Change Proposals
(VECPs) is the responsibility of the contracting Officer. The
contracting officer or other designated official shall
promptly process and objectively evaluate each VECP. The
Government is responsible fnr accepting or rejecting the VECP
within 45 days of receipt [Ref. 46:p. 48-3]. If more time is
needed to evaluate the VECP, the contracting officer shall
notify the contractor in writing explaining the reason and
anticipated decision date. Any VECP may be approved, in whole
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or in part, by a contract modification. The decision to
accept or reject a VECP; the determination of collateral costs
or savings; and the decision as to which of the sharing rates
applies, are not subject to the disputes clause or otherwise
subject to litigation under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
[Ref. 46: p. 48-31. Each DOD component is required to compile
and submit an annual statistical summary of their value
engineering efforts to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Production and Logistics within 45 days of the close of the
fiscal year [Ref. 31: p. 13-1). Building on this summary
understanding of the DOD VE program, a brief look at the
Navy's VE guidance follows.
D. THE NAVY'S VE PROGRAM
The Navy implements its Value Engineering program through
the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM),
via NAVSUP INSTRUCTION 4858.52A of 14 December 1988 [Ref. 36].
The Navy policy states:
The VE methodology shall be utilized to effect cost
restraint on systems, equipment, facilities, -and material
being developed, designed, procured, produced,
constructed, maintained, modified, and stored. Such
restraint is to be exercised by eliminating unessential
requirements and spec.Fications, integrating VE into the
entire process of cc.Iuisition and logistic support,
emphasizing the acco•.:-plishment of VE in the initial
design/development phases prior to prototype production,
of all Navy weapons systems and products to assist in
determining unit cost-to-produce and support cost goals,
and by emphasizing accomplishment of VE when procuring
large quantities of identical components, items, parts,
and equipment. [Ref. 36: p. 2]
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As noted in the above quote, it appears that the Navy is
attempting to push for implementation of the VE effort as
early as possible in the acquisition process. This seems
quite appropriate due to the fact that it is generally
recognized that earlier use of this cost saving technique can
only lead to greater savings in the long run. The Navy
guidance assigns NAVSUPSYSCOM responsibilities which include;
implementation of the Navy VE program, designating a program
administrator, reviewing the VE program at field activities,
coordinating training requirements, managing and coordinating
the Incentive Awards program, and collecting VE performance
data and reports (Ref. 36:p. 3].
With the foundation set on how the Government policies are
structured to work, a quick look at the current practices of
Value Analysis within Industry will provide background for
comparison with the Government's practices of VE.
E. INDUSTRY VALUE ANALYSIS
Industry as with Government has seen its peaks and valleys
with Value Analysis. A quick look at the covers of Purchasing
magazine seems to be indicative of the way VA is viewed. In
1985, "Value Analysis" was in bold capital letters with the
background a brilliant Gold plate and more than 30 pages
dedicated to various articles on VA. A similar issue was
published in 1986 with a Silver plate background on the cover.
For the 1990 and 1991 issues covering VA, there was just a
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small blocked out section on the top of each cover with the
respective statements; "VA Report '90" and "'91". These
issues published 10 to 15 pages on Value Analysis. This seems
to reflect the trend in VA within industry in general, that
Value Analysis is not one of the companies top priorities.
Another indicator of industry's current VA practi-e is
reflected in a conversation with Len Struessel, Vice President
of Production, General Dynamics (GD), Pamona, during a plant
visit in May 1992 [Ref. 54]. He stated that GD had no one
specifically assigned to a Value Engineering/Analysis process,
however, the responsibility of evaluating the products and the
manufacturing process was accomplished within the Industrial
Engineer Division of the company. He further went on to say
that the priority of responsibilities within the production
department were: 1) quality, 2) schedule, and 3) cost.
Therefore, VE cannot be considered the top priority, but
should receive significant attention with cost being in the
top three concerns of production. This seems to follow good
business practice as all companies seek to make a profit and
a reduction in costs should increase profit with all other
variables remaining constant.
F. SUMMARY
Appendix B provides a sample Value Engineering application
problem which explains the process that a contracting officer
would be required to follow when a VECP is accepted from a
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contractor. It's quite simple and brief, and will provide the
reader a more complete understanding of the Value Engineering
terms and process discussed in this chapter, as well as
reflect the VE impact on cost savings for both the contractor
and the Government. With the basic understanding developed in
the past two chapters, of where VE has been and the current
policies in effect, the spare parts acquisition process will
be explained in the next chapter. The subsequent chapters
will examine where Government procurement officials and
contracting officers might best implement the use of these VE
policies, specifically in the acquisition for spare parts.
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IV. SPARE PARTS ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The spares acquisition environment was tarnished in the
1980's by several horror stories trumpeted by Congress, the
media and others. Examples include the over pricing cases of
the common $15 claw hammer for $435; the 4 cent diode for
$110; and the 45 cent allen wrench for $9000, to name only a
few [Ref. 12: p. 91. These certainly are not representative
of the true spares acquisition arena which is quite different,
made up of millions of parts and subassemblies. However, as
a result of these difficulties, then Secretary of Defense,
Casper Weinberger, published a memorandum to the Services and
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) outlining a ten-point spare
parts procurement get well plan [Ref. 22]. The Secretary
immediately followed up this plan with another memorandum
mandating twenty-five specific actions to be taken by the
Services in controlling spare parts prices [Ref. 23] . In
response to this guidance, each of the Services and DLA
initiated ambitious reform programs. Examples of programs
which have evolved as a result of the Secretaries direction
include the "Break-Out" program, the Army's Spare Parts Review
INiTiative (SPRINT), and the Navy's Buy Our Spares Smart
(BOSS) program. Each of these reforms focuses on increasing
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competition, reducing the cost of spares to the Government,
while attempting to institutionalize sound purchasing
practices.
For the purpose of this thesis spare parts will be an all
inclusive term, defined as:
Spare parts. Spares and repair parts, reparable and
consumable, purchased for use in the maintenance, overhaul,
and repair of equipment such as ships, tanks, flflns,
aircraft, missiles, ground communication and elecxr nic
systems, ground support and associated test equipment ...
it includes items, spares, repair parts, parts,
subasqemblies,components, and subsystems, but excludes end
items such as aircraft, ships, tanks, guns, and missiles.
[Ref. 44: p. 5]
As noted earlier this definition of spare parts includes
millions of individual items. The most current estimate is
approximately 9.4 million total spare parts, with DLA
responsible for managing roughly 66 percent of these, for a
total of 6.2 million [Ref. 50].
The following pages will familiarize the reader with the
DOD spare parts procurement process by first defining and
discussing the two distinct facets of spare parts
acquisitions, initial spares and replenishment spares, and
then provide an overview of each of these procurement
processes.
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B. INITIAL AND REPLENISHMENT SPARE PARTS DEFINED
Spare parts are generally purchased in two phases to
support a weapon system. The first phase is called "initial"
or "provisioning" spares and takes place as part of the
weapons system contract. These initial parts are the parts
required to support the first group of weapon system units
fielded from the first system production contract. The
purchase of initial spare parts occurs primarily during the
early production phase of the weapon system. They are
continued to be procured to support modifications and design
changes. Once design stabilization has been accomplished and
the initial weapon system supported through the initial
spares, there is a shift to the second phase of spare parts
procurement known as "replenishment" spares. These
replenishment spares are procured on subsequent contracts or
orders, after identifiable demand patterns have been
established. Accordingly, replenishment spare parts
acquisitions are limited during the early production phase and
increase substantially as time progresses.
C. THE SPARE PARTS ACQUISITION PROCESS
Planning for the procurement of spare parts should start
at the very beginning of the acquisition cycle, e.g., included
in the overall acquisition strategy or plan, which acts as the
road map for execution of the entire program. The early
phases of major system acquisitions require numerous reports
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and approvals at the milestone decision points prior to
progressing along further in the procurement cycle. One such
required report that pertains to the spare parts realm is the
Logistics Support Analysis (LSA). This requirement, along
with others, will be addressed in more detail as the two
spares acquisitior processes are developed. As discussed
earlier the acquisition of spare parts falls into two distinct
categories, initial and replenishment, and as a result each of
these processes will be explained in the next two sections.
1. THE PROVISIONING SPARE PARTS PROCESS
Initial spares are selected through the process known
as provisioning, which is the process of selecting spare parts
and support equipment needed to support the weapon system when
it is deployed (Ref. 44: p. 153]. To accomplish this task,
both Government and contractor personnel, typically hard
science and industrial engineers along with logisticians, are
continuously conducting Logistics Support Analyses (LSA)
throughout the developmental phase of the system procurement.
These early LSA analyses will be used to address areas such as
reliability and maintainability (R&M) as well as develop and
define supporL ability related design and manufacturing factors
[Ref. 29: p. 7-A-3]. The information and data that are
generated from the LSA provides the basis for establishing the
requirements in the provisioning process. The initial spare
parts that are eventually identified and procured are usually
31
funded through the supported weapon system procurement account
fund. This procurement account is the means by which
investment programs are budgeted, authorized and funded by
specific acts of Congress [Ref. 44:p 153].
Referring back to the major systems acquisition
process (Figure 1), it is during phase two, Engineering and
Manufacturincr Development (EMD), when the Government requests,
in the form of a contract data requirements list (CDRL), the
contractor to develop a list of spares or repair parts that
will support the initial end items fielded during Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP). The contractor must take several
interacting variables, quch as estimating failure rates of
items and sufficient quantities to meet desired support, into
consideration when developing the initial provisioning list.
This process is quite complex, occurring at a period in the
acquisition process when the design of the system has yet to
be finalized; and therefore is based on numerous assumptions,
speculations, and estimates interpreted by the contractor.
The provisioning list is also influenced in part by
the Government, from decisions made by the program office
which guide the support concept. These decisions focus
primarily on the issue of the appropri7,> levels of
maintenance - field, intermediate or depot - for the various
components and the stage of development of the item [Ref. 44:
p. 155]. The finalized list is provided in the form of a
Logistics Support Analysis Record (LSAR). The Government and
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contractor then meet in what is known as the provisioning
conference which usually takes place shortly after award of
the first production contract. It is here that the contractor
documentation is formally reviewed and the list is approved
and finalized. This conference and final list are critical
since it is the base against which future requirements and
acquisition decisions will be made [Ref. 44: p. 156].
The list of items are then assigned National Stock
Numbers (NSNs), and the quantitative requirements for each
part are consolidated into an initial provisioning order that
is subsequently negotiated and agreed upon. The spare parts
are then delivered to the inventory system [Ref. 44: p. 158].
The provisioning process is illustrated graphically by the
diagram presented in Figure 2.
2. THE REPLENISHMENT SPARE PARTS PROCESS
After a weapon system spare part has been identified
by the initial spare parts process and introduced into the DOD
inventory, subsequent purchases are normally accomplished
through the replenishment spare parts process.- Replenishment
spares are simply spares that are used to restocK the supply
system. Therefore, the replenishment procurement is the
process of restocking the inventory as a resuli of parts being
consured by the operating and supporting (e.g., maixic:nance)
activities [Ref. 44: p. 158].
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Figure 2: Provisioning Spare Parts Procurement Process
Source: OFPP Spare Parts Study [Ref. 44: p. 155].
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Each spare part is managed by a single designated
Inventory Control Point (ICP) within DOD and assigned to a
specific item manager. There are seventeen ICPs within the
DOD and they maintain sophisticated data base systems that
provide logistical type data on each spare part to enhance and
improve maintenance and support of the end item. There are
many functional elements including unit cost, usage data,
weapon system application, availability and appropriate
stockage levels to name a few, that are intertwined, thus
making the procurement of spare parts a very complex
procurement process. Stock funds are typically used in the
procurement of replenishment spares. A stock fund is a
revolving account originally established through the
capitalization of assets. Assets are sold from stock to
customers who reimburse the stock fund from their appropriated
funds at the time of the sale. The stock fund replenishes
its asset position using its own capital and is not subject to
in-depth Congressional review and approval as part of the
normal fiscal year budget authorization process [Ref. 44:
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D. SUKO•ARY
The Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) process and the
development of LSAs are critical elements to insuring the
acquisition of necessary initial spare parts. Note that these
mechanisms are applied during the EMD phase, and as explained
in the previous chapter, Value Engineering is also emphasized
during EMD. Consequently initial spares are reviewed through
the VE process to some extent due to this dual effort applied
during EMD. However, it is essential to remember that the
final configuration and design of the system has yet to be
firmed up at this point and the initial quantities procured
most likely are relatively small.
Because of the complexities of the provisioning process
(in association with the major systems acquisition process)
and the development of the initial spare parts list based
primarily on guess work or estimates by the contractor, VE
does not ideally lend itself to this process. As a result, it
is this researcher's belief that significant VE application or
effort should be directed at the procurement process of
acquiring replenishment spares. It appears that numerous VE
opportunities and significant savings might develop if VE is
applied appropriately. A more complete and detailed analysis
of this hypothesis is discussed next, in Chapter V. Also, the
use of the stock fund in the process of replenishment spare
parts procurement can have significant potential application
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for increased Value Engineering efforts in the spares
community as will be seen in Chapter V.
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V. VALUE ENGINEERING APPLICATION TO SPARE PARTS PROCUERENT
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
As with any sound program there is no substitute for
common sense and good judgment. Relatively few programs or
projects comprise the majority of costs within the DOD and
Department of the Navy, and thus, VE efforts should be
concentrated on these programs and projects. Table 2
illuminates this point.
TABLE 2
DOD PRIME CONTRACT ACTIONS BY SIZE: FY 1991
(Contracts Over $25,000; Dollar Amounts in Millions)
SIZE IN DOLLARS TOTAL PERCENTBY CONTRACT NUMBER $AMOUNT NUMBER $AMOUNT
25,000- 49,999 65,482 2,043 28.6 1.6
50,000- 99,999 58,549 3,643 25.5 2.9
100,000- 199,999 38,689 4,802 16.9 3.8
200,000- 299,999 17,329 3,676 7.6 2.9
300,000- 499,999 17,492 5,859 7.6 4.6
500,000- 999,999 14,339 8,281 6.3 6.6
1,000,000- 1,999,999 8,150 9,269 3.6 7.3
2,000,000- 2,999,999 3,044 5,828 1.3 4.6
3,000,000- 4,999,999 2,551 8,156 1.1 6.5
5,000,000- 9,999,999 1,938 11,605 0.8 9.2
10,000,000- OR MORE 1,755 63,134 0.8 50.0
Source: DOD (Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate
for Information Operations & Reports)
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As reflected in Table 2, by totalling the last 5 rows of data
(i.e., the contracts greater than 1 million dollars), the DOD
had a total of 7.6 percent of all contracts awarded that
accounted for 77.6 percent of the total dollar amount. It is
here, within these contracts, that the VE process and
application must be emphasized to recognize the most lucrative
results of additional cost savings.
The contractor program (VECP) savings goal as a percent of
total obligation authority for the DOD has been established at
0.7 percent [Ref. 42:p. 14]. Despite the fact that this goal
has been elusive over the years, the VE process has proven to
be successful. Value Engineering success stories are numerous
and range from improving small independent spare parts to
major subassemblies for entire weapon systems as well as
design process improvements for construction type projects.
The GAO report (June 23, 1992) titled "Value Engineering:
Usefulness Well Established When Applied Appropriately" drives
home this point and contains an attachment that lists several
other GAO titles over the recent years which are relevant to
VE and its successful application [Ref. 43].
This chapter will analyze the VE procedure and its
application to the spare parts acquisition process by: first,
distinguishing and discussing repeated problems associated
with VE in general; second, reviewing current VE statistical
data collected during the research effort; third, identifying
40
and establishing the factors or criteria that are critical for
VE use and relating their appropriateness to the spares
procurement cycle; fourth, examining a recent VE effort
oriented towards spare parts known as Logistics Engineering
Change Proposals (LECPs), which has been initiated at the
Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Department of the Navy; and
finally, glance toward the future and where VE is headed.
B. VE PROBLEMS
History of the DOD VE program indicates that there are
four broad areas of concern for achieving greater savings from
contractor VECPs:
1. Lack of continuous top level DOD management visibility
and support.
2. Inadequate incentives for DOD program and procurement
personnel to strongly encourage contractor VECP
activity.
3. Lack of contractor awareness and confidence that VECPs
will be favorably received by DOD.
4. General management weakness in the VE program.
[Ref. 42: p. 17]
These four concerns and others (e.g., the timely processing of
VECPs and unclear explanations of acceptance or rejection
criteria), are highlighted in several of the references.
These problems have been noted since the early 1970's and
throughout the 1980's and still seem to be present in today's
VE environment. The principal problem associated with
accomplishing VE for spare parts is the lengthy approval
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process (Ref. 51]. Manufacturers have occasionally
accomplished significant portions of their production runs
before the configuration control board approves the pertinent
VECP. The DOD has made progress addressing these concerns at
times, but continued effort for improvement is still needed.
These problems will be discussed and evaluated from both the
Government and contractor perspectives.
The most noted problem described by numerous references
was the general attitude and lack of acceptance of VE by both
Government and contractor personnel. Reasons for this
viewpoint varied. Government concerns were driven by the
realities of "defective pricing". There is good reason for
this, as proven in the several GAO reports of recent years
which focus on overpricing and defective pricing audits.
Another issue expressed was that the companies would often
hold back their best ideas, providing just enough to win
award, so they could later improve their profits during the
execution of the contract by submitting VECPs. This
incremental approach to improvement is an - area that VE
advocates must be watchful of and ensure does not occur. As
a result of these issues, defective pricing and holding back
best ideas, a lack of proper top management support and
recognition of the VE program within the DOD has evolved.
Another concern of the Government acquisition professional
is one of contract integrity. To effectively implement VE
within our various contracts, our initial step should be to
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include it in the solicitation document, and make it part of
the selection criteria. The incentive of the VE clauses
cannot influence, impact, or effect the incentive or terms of
the agreed contract. VECPs should not be rewarded both as
value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-
cost, or similar incentives of the contract. Thus, if the
VECP is accepted, then it should only be rewarded under the VE
clause and not the other incentives [Ref. 13: p. 6951.
A few concerns from the contractor's point of view also
deserve mention. The two most pressing factors influencing
the contractor's desire to avoid VE was: 1) the processing
time required to accept or reject the proposed VECP routinely
exceeded the 45 day limit and 2) the approval/disapproval
criteria were of questionable character. The first issue is
self-explanatory, the Government needs to respond in a timely
fashion or make the approval period longer to resolve this
problem. The second concern might have some validity to it.
The issue focuses around the approving authority, the
contracting officer, who awarded the original contract. This
problem can best be shown through the following brief example:
a contractor submits a VECP to save dollars by changing a
specification, and the contracting officer approves it. This
can be perceived as a failure on the part of the contracting
officer in his initial review and approval of the
specification. As a result the contractor gets a percentage
of the savings [Ref. ll:p. 16]. The additional profits
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acquired by the contractor are also often related to an
atmosphere of deficiency for the contracting officer's
original actions regarding the contract. The option that the
contracting officer often relies upon to avoid this potential
embarrassing situation is to deny the VECP. Remember too,
the contractor cannot dispute the approval or disapproval of
his VECP, so the approving authority has an avenue out.
Despite the problems associated with the Value Engineering
program, it still remains to be an effective and positive
method towards cost reduction. A review of current VE
statistical data from various DOD organizations follows.
C. STATISTICAL DATA REVIEW
This section will provide a comparative analysis of four
years (1989 through 1992) of statistical data from the total
DOD VE program, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the
Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). The evaluation and
review of these data will reveal or identify trends that are
apparent in the VE program statistical reports. The DOD
figures will be reviewed and commented on first, followed by
the DLA and NAVSUP information which is directly related to
spare parts VE savings.
1. DOD VE STATISTICS
Tables 3 and 4 are summaries of the DOD VE program,
first by the contractor (VECPs) program and then the in-house
program (VEPs). Appendix C provides a detailed breakdown of
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this information by individual Service and DLA and provides
additional statistics such as personnel assigned to VE and
training accomplishments.
TABLE 3
DOD VALUE ENGINEERING PROGRAM SUMMARY
(Contractor Program VECPs)
1989 1990 1991 1992
# of VECPs 1176 929 672 964
Submitted
# VECPs 816 635 420 392
Approved
% APPROVED 69.61 68.4% 62.5% 40.7%
NET SAVINGS $216.8M $242.6M $398.7M $319.9M
ROI 7:1 10:1 3:1 3:1
Source: Developed by the researcher.
On average the annual submission of contractor
generated VECPs is 935. Most notably exhibited in Table 3 is
a trend in the percentage of VECPs being approved, starting at
almost 70 percent and dropping to nearly 40 percent in a four
year period. It is well-realized that the Government will only
approve a VECP if it will increase the value of the item
and/or reduce costs, but this trend can only deter contractors
from participating in the DOD VE program. Also, the
contractor net saving for each year is relatively low and the
return on investment ratios are well below the minimum (15:1)
ratio the Government establishes, which must be estimated
prior to initiating action on a VEP. These data paint a
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gloomy picture for the contractor; its no wonder few desire to
be active players in the Value Engineering program.
Table 4 presents the statistical data from the DOD's
in-house VE program.
TABLE 4
DOD VALUE ENGINEERING PROGRAM SUMMARY
(In-House Program VEPs)
1989 1990 1991 1992
# of VEPs 7769 7349 11,141 8439
Submitted
# VEPs 4655 4934 5146 4401
Approved
% APPROVED 59.9% 67.1% 46.2% 52.2%
NET SAVINGS $1.23B $1.2B $699.5M $750.4M
ROI 26:1 29:1 23:1 15:1
Source: Developed by the researcher.
The information from Table 4 resembles a much more
effective and stable VE program. Note how the approval rate
averages about 53 percent and the ROI (return on investment)
ratios are in excess of 20:1 with the exception of last year,
which was only 15:1 but this still greatly exceeded any of the
contractor ROI ratios over the past four years. The net
dollar saving generated from the in-house program are also
much larger, reaching over one billion dollars in two of the
years reviewed.
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After comparing Tables 3 and 4 a few general, yet
simple questions seem to arise:
1. Why is there such disparity between the two programs?
2. Why are contractozs not generating more VECPs when they
are the specialists who know and/or meet our needs and
ingenious changes and improvements can only increase
their profit percentages?
3. How can we urge more contractors to participate in VE?
The questions and the previously identified trends appear to
validate and reinforce the four major concerns identified
earlier in the VE problems section. Contractors quite
possibly are distrustful of the VE program and question DOD
management support of VE. Is the DOD truly active in
promoting and reinforcing the benefits of VECPs or are they
simply inattentive to providing incentives for more active VE
participates? Recommendations for possible improvements in
these areas of concern will be proposed in Chapter VI. The
next section focuses on evalua'ing the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) VE statistical data for the past four years, and
the following section examines Navy Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) VE information. The data presented in both the DLA
and NAVSUP sections, directly reflect on VE performance as it
relates to spare parts procurement.
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2. DLA VE STATISTICS
Due to the current restructuring efforts
(consolidation) that are ongoing today within the DOD, the DLA
will be receiving approximately an additional one million
consumable parts for management throughout the next year. As
of March 1993, the DLA manages 62 percent of the 5 million
items (3.1 million) and 70 percent of the 4.4 million
consumable parts (3.08 million) in the Federal catalog, for a
total of 6.18 million spare parts [Ref. 50]. For the DOD to
recognize significant VE savings in the spare parts
procurement process, DLA will have to embark on a serious VE
endeavor.
The current DLA regulation (DLAR) guiding the VE
program is dated 5 April 1985. It is however, currently
under review and soon to be published with various changes for
improvement. The proposed or araft DLAR is very exhaustive,
requiring the five Defense Supply Centers (DSCs) to take a
pro-active approach toward VE. The regulation addresses the
total DLA VE program plan; highlights include: eight annual VE
achievement awards, selection of an annual outstanding VE
action for public recognition, procedures for selection of in-
house VE study projects and proposals (a potential ROI of only
10:1 is requlired), training requirements, emphasis on
expedient processing of VECPs, and recognition of other
related cost saving/avoidance techniques such as reverse
engineering and "should cost"/intrinsic value analysis
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procedures [Ref. 26]. It appears to be a well-organized and
all inclusive document which should enhance successful
employment of the DLA VE program in the future. The DLA
operations and research department is also analyzing potential
development of a computer model to assist in identifying
potential spare parts for VE review. Currently, DLA VE
personnel primarily evaluate spares that are high dollar items
or procured from a sole source. Other factors that might be
screened in the future include large quarterly demand parts,
consumable items transfered from the Services, unacceptable
production lead times, and readiness issues [Ref. 50]. Table
5 is a summary of DLA VE information for the past four years.
The data from DLA again indicate the fact that
contractor participation is quite low, almost nonexistent in
1992, with only 36 VECPs received and 16 approved for a meager
net savings of 1.4 million dollars. The in-house VE efforts
seems to be quite adequate and pretty consistent, maintaining
about 115 VE personnel and achieving an average 64.4 million
dollars in savings annually. The DLA program is well
established but will need increased attention in the future
years as a result of the changing spare parts management
environment. Through more concentration on the VE program,




VALUE ENGINEERING PROGRAM SUMMhARY
1989 1990 1991 1992
# of Full time VE 117 121 114 118
Personnel
# VEPs: developed/ 2214/ 1882/ 2887/ 3512/
approved 1972 2196* 3502* 3401
**Net Savings $67.2M $47.4M $64.8M $78.1M
# VECPs: received/ 108/ 75/ 40/ 36/
approved 43 44 24 16
Net Savings $1.72M $4.79M $1.95M $1.44M
Total ROI 15:1 11:1 13:1 14:1
(Includes VEPs &
VECPs savings)
*Quantity approved exceeds number developed due to carry over
from previous year.
**This figure does not include the savings reported for the
Contractual Aspects of Value Engineering (CAVE) which are
classified as indirect savings generated from other than the
DLA VE office. If the CAVE savings are included, then the ROI
ratios improve significantly; 28:1, 21:1, 25:1, and 21:1 for
the years 1989 through 1992 respectively.
Source: Developed by the researcher.
3. NAVSUP VE STATISTICS
The NAVSUP VE data over the past four years are
provided in Table 6. These figures are for the Navy supply
system only, which reflect spare parts VE data. As noted
earlier the total Navy VE statistics can be found in Appendix
C. The history of VE in general at NAVSUP has seen its ups
and downs. Changes in VE policy were often politically driven
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and reflect the commanders decision as to which programs
deserve attention. The NAVSUP VE program reached its most
productive year in 1989, achieving a total savings of greater
than 18 million dollars [Ref. 511. During this period they
were very active in educating contractors on the Navy VE
program and its goals. Two briefings were given to small
businesses in Cleveland, Ohio and Detroit, Michigan, during
'88 and '89 [Ref. 51]. Toward the end of the 1989 fiscal
year the VE program was cut back significantly and has since
declined. NAVSUP's VE information presented in Table 6
includes Navy Facilities Command (NAVFAC), Ships Parts Control
Center (SPCC) and Aviation Supply Office (ASO).
As mentioned before and seen in the data, the NAVSUP
VE program is essentially nonexistent today as a result of the
1989 change of commanders focus. The personnel reductione
have left only one dedicated VE representative, and the
position is symbolic at best. These changes have lead to
little VE activity on both the in-house and contractor
programs. The SPCC VE manager, Dick Zider, -explained that
they were once active promoters of VE, conducting contractor
fairs and placing VE advertisements in trade magazines. These
promotions had created increased involvement in both VEPs and
VECPs submissions, leading to significant savings [Ref. 55].
However, recent budget constraints and the consumable parts
transfers that are ongoing, have severely impacted on SPCC's
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TABLE 6
Naval Supply Systems Command
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF VE ACTIONS
1989 1990 1991 1992
# of Full time VE 5 3 1 1
Personnel
# VEPs: developed/ 43/ 15/ 3/ 3/
approved 43 12 2 1
Net Savings $8.95M $1.8M $201K $12K
ROI 265:1 869:1 11:1 5:1
# VECPs: received/ 58/ 23/ 11/ 5/
approved 36 14 7 3
Net Savings $9.57M $7.02M $614K $5.15M
ROI 81:1 16:1 15:1 147:1
Average processing N/A 61 82 51
time for VECPs(days)
# VECPs requiring N/A 14 4 3
plus 45 days 1 __
Source: Developed by the researcher.
VE business, and other cost avoidance programs like reverse
engineering and the "break-out" procedure [Ref. 51 & 57]. In
the past two years not much VE activity has occurred at SPCC
and their focus has shifted to Total Quality Leadership
(TQL) [Ref. 57].
Another key item that NAVSUP reports is the average
processing time for VECPs. As Table 6 indicates, for the
three years reported on, the total processing time exceeds the
required time of 45 days established by the Federal
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Acquisition Regulation (FAR). This again reflects contractor
concerns with the Government's commitment to VE.
To overcome the recent difficulties NAVSUP has fallen
victim to, they intend to "re-energize" their VE program
through support of VE from their new commander and will be
acting on an aggressive plan to align VE with TQL. Initiation
efforts are also underway to re-establish personal contact
between cognizant VE personnel and the twenty-five largest
suppliers for each inventory control point (ICP), to include
presentation of a more detailed briefing to the contractor and
challenging them to submit two or more VECPs each year.
Additionally, a nation-wide round of contractor conferences is
presently being discussed in cooperation with the DLA VE
program office. The goal of this total VE initiative is to
see positive results within the next two years [Ref. 51].
D. ANALYSIS/KEYS TO APPLYING VE TO SPARES PROCUREMENT
As explained in Chapter IV, the procurement of spare parts
consists of two distinct phases, initial and replenishment
spare parts procurement. Since the provisioning process is
intertwined with the major systems acquisition program and
process, it is necessary to evaluate the initial spares
procurement process in conjunction with the VE program for the
major systems acquisition process. The replenishment spares
procuremen VE process will be discussed separately.
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Before addressing each of these areas though, it is
critical to understand that changes produced from the VE
process must be properly managed and evaluated prior to
acceptance. Any changes in components or the product itself
may have profound effects on not only its cost, but
performance, appearance, compatibility, configuration (a most
crucial area which must be thoroughly surveyed) and the
manufacturing process. Communication between the Government
and contractor as well as among several different internal
Government offices or departments is required to totally
review the complete effect that the change will create. It is
often a difficult process, requiring a team effort based on
strong working relationships and communication.
1. VE CONCERNS FOR INITIAL SPARES PROCUREMENT
The definition of VE, indicates the fact that the VE
process is a systematic evaluation which should be an ongoing
process throughout the entire development and production of a
product or service. The Government currently implements VE
within the major systems acquisition process at Phase II, the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, even
though earlier emphasis would be more advantageous. It is at
this time where the provisioning process for spares parts is
also initiated. The VE effort that the contractor undertakes
for the entire weapon system program will directly impact on
the initial spares to be procured.
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For the VE program to wholly impact on the
provisioning process, VE work should begin earlier at the
Demonstration and Validation (DEMVAL) phase (see Figure 1 for
the major system acquisition phases). There is no need for
the VE process to begin with the Concept Exploration phase
because at this point the various contractors with Research
and Development (R&D) contracts are already motivated to do
the best possible job and to provide the most innovative
product to satisfy the Government needs. The contractors are
seeking continued business via advancing into the next phase,
provided they are successful at developing a satisfactory
product. It is at the conclusion of DEMVAL where the
Government begins to weed out some of the contractors and
proposed solutions or alternatives. During the DEMVAL phase
is where the Government should emphasize the participation or
requirement for VE. To execute and complete this phase the
contractor must produce the first prototype of the system or
various components of the system (which will eventually
require provisional spare parts to support it) for testing.
It seems only logical that the VE effort begin to improve the
process and product at the earliest time possible.
The change to use VE during DEMVAL emphasizes the
philosophy of early versus later VE participation. VECPs have
the greatest cost savings potential when incorporated at the
earliest possible point. The Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of a
program start at the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) or needs
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determination step. The earlier VE is implemented, the
greater the savings or "cost avoidance" will be. The
increased savings is caused by more units in the production
run being affected by the change and lower implementation
costs which will carry throughout the remaining acquisition
phases. For the contractor, his total share savings will be
higher, leading to increased profits. This should be an
incentive as profit is the primary stimulus to encourage
contractor participation in VE, and large profits can be
accumulated through VE - contractors earn about 43 cents for
each dollar the DOD saves through approved VECPs [Ref 30:
p.3-2]. The earlier in the procurement process VE is started
the better off both the Government and contractor will be.
Also through early VE application the initial spare parts are
more likely to be properly designed and capable of supporting
the system when it is deployed.
It must be recognized that the procurement of spare
parts throughout either phases I or II (DEMVAL or EMD) is very
difficult because of design instability. The- contractor VE
effort will be directed at the entire weapon system, not
individual spare parts. The contractor most likely will not
have the time or resources to put forth a strong VE review of
applicable individual spare part for potential improvements
and savings opportunities. The primary focus of the
contractor at this time in the acquisition cycle will be
staying on schedule and within the original cost estimates,
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with the goal of providing an operational system that fulfills
the contractual agreement and meets the needs of the customer.
The contractor will not be expending much effort and resources
on cost saving techniques such as Value Engineering.
The provisioning process appears to be oriented toward
the Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP)
program. The SAIP concept attempts to take advantage of
economies of scale by combining and procuring spare parts
concurrently with parts being produced for the end item.
Thus, SAIP too is a cost avoidance program. It tries to
minimize the cost of spares by avoiding the numerous charges
related with individual purchase orders and manufacturing
processes. The SAIP program is not solely limited to the
provisioning process and can also be incorporated into the
acquisition of replenishment spare parts. As system
production continues out over many years, the spares can be
procured simultaneously during production of the system items.
Considering the factors discussed above, it is
difficult to expect sincere VE efforts from -the contractor
directed toward the initial spares that will be procured. The
most critical product the Government must receive in the
provisioning process is an adequate technical data package
(TDP) for all the parts procured. The TDP can pay dividends
later, in the replenishment spare parts procurement process,
through VE commitment and reverse engineering. With this in
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mind it seems that greater potential for VE application is
obtainable in the procurement of replenishment spare parts.
2. VE CONCERNS FOR REPLENISHMENT SPARES PROCUREMENT
That VE earlier in the acquisition process is better,
doesn't imply that later in the process, VE efforts will not
yield significant savings. Replenishment spares are procured
at a point when the operational system has been stabilized and
after the initial spares have been depleted. It is at this
point in the acquisition cycle, Low Rate Initial Production
(LRIP), that specific application of VE energy can and should
be applied to individual items and components of the system,
i.e., the spare parts for the system.
The improved performance and quality as well as cost
savings aspect of the VE concept must continue to be
emphasized throughout the life cycle of the system. It must
be continually elaborated that there is always opportunity for
additional savings or improved quality and performance
throughout the life of the program. A simple VE example
illustrates this issue: Over time a spare -part has been
proven to be much more reliable than originally expected. As
a result the contractor or a Government representative may
recommend that testing requirements could be reduced or
eliminated. The effect of this simple change can lead to
significant reduced costs when procuring the item.
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As also noted earlier, Value Engineering seems to be
most effective and work best with products that are unique in
nature or of relatively new design, i.e., a new weapon system
and its supporting spare parts fit this requisite. These
types of items allow for flexibility and innovation on the
part of the contractor. Parallel to this reality, is the idea
of trying to have the contractor challenge the Government on
unrealistic requirements and specifications. This effort also
reflects on the relatively recent major policy shift within
the DOD to utilize commercial specifications versus Federal or
military specifications, as well as functional or performance
specifications over design specifications whenever feasible.
The mandatory/required VE approach is recommended for use in
contract situations where these type of specifications are
utilized and the contractor is likely to recognize cost
savings. Voluntary or incentive VE clauses should be used
when the contractor is working to detailed drawings and design
specifications.
The primary goal and objective of VE- is associated
with dollars, specifically cost savings and return on
investment, which has lead the majority of VE applications on
spare parts to center on high dollar items, large quantity
requirements, and sole source items. These three areas are
obvious starting points to begin when evaluating spare parts
for VE candidates and savings. However, as high dollar items,
large quantity requirements and sole source items become less
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available, other potential factors or items must be considered
for cost savings. These other factors or areas of concern for
VE employment should not be underestimated or overlooked.
They include reliability and maintainability, producibility,
production lead times, performance, and quality. Improvement
in these areas are often difficult to quantify and equate to
dollar savings, and consequently make the decision to use
resources and VE techniques hard to justify. This is the
direction that VE must proceed in the replenishment spare
parts procurement process if it is to expand and be used to
its fullest potential rather than remain underutilized.
Other key cost savings techniques which are closely
related and associated with the VE program include: value
analysis techniques like the current "should cost" and "could
cost" approaches discussed earlier; reverse engineering, which
takes a component or spare part and breaks it down to each
individual part to understand how the item functions and is
manufactured; and the "break-out" program, which focuses on
procuring items directly from the source, eiiminating the
middle man (prime contractor). The uniqueness VE has to
distinguish it from these programs is that VE is both in-house
and contractor oriented, while these other cost saving
programs are conducted through in-house work only. These
concepts along with VE all strive to generate significant cost
savings in the procurement process. By mixing or integrating
these different programs into the procurement of spare parts,
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the DOD can draw upon each program's strengths to achieve
maximum savings. Caution must be given however, to ensure
that these various programs are implemented as intended and
that the programs remain distinctive in nature and
application. If not, the programs will become obscured and
lose their effectiveness.
A new twist has recently been augmented to the VE
program by the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO) which
directly impacts on the way VE is applied to spare parts
procurement within ASO. This new approach is known as the
Logistics Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) and will be
dicussed next.
E. LOGISTICS ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS (LECPs)
The Logistics Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) is very
similar to a VECP and the VE process, however it is a much
more efficient program. It is strictly an Navy Aviation
Supply Office (ASO) program designed to cut through much of
the bureaucratic red tape and review process associated with
the formal VE process [Ref. 53]. As a result of the
compressed procedures for approving the LECP and reduced
processing time required, the Government and contractor will
be able to realize more cost savings. This approach should be
appealing to all parties involved.
The LECP process is part of the Best Overall Support
Solution II (BOSS II) program. The purpose of the BOSS II
61
program is to develop a logistical partnership based on
continuous program improvements, between Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR), ASO, the Fleet, the NADEPs, and industry to
reduce costs to the customer (the Fleet) while maintaining
Fleet readiness [Ref. 38:p. 1]. An LECP is defined as:
A reliability or maintainability related Engineer Change
Proposal (ECP) for an ASO managed item, sponsored and
funded by ASO, designed to reduce or eliminate support
costs while maintaining or improving safety and
performance. [Ref. 38:p. 6-21.
A key feature to this program is the use of ASO funding to
implement the LECP rather than requiring program office
dollars to be used as in the case of VECPs. Typical
candidates are items with high reprocurement costs and/or high
repair costs that promise a quick return on investment (ROI
within five years) [Ref 38: Encl. 2]. Once the candidate is
identified it undergoes a cost-benefit analysis as well as the
ROI calculation. Appendix D provides a flow chart to
illustrate the functions required to process, an LECP from
candidate identification to the Configuration Control Board
(CCB) approval. Since the BOSS II initiation, ASO, by
replacing items with high reprocurement costs and/or high
repair costs with more reliable items, -.s reducing the need
for reprocurment and reaping significant near-term and long-
term savings [Ref. 38:p. 6-3]. Since the BOSS II program has
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only been in effect less than a year, it is hard to evaluate
it's success but it appears to show great potential.
The use of Navy stock funds makes this program quite
unique. An argument can be made for this funding situation
for two basic reasons. First, there is a direct advantage to
the stock fund for any savings generated by the VE mechanisms.
This advantage results when reduction of unit prices is
achieved, thereby allowing de-obligation of stock funds and
allowing them for reuse. Second, this approach frees the
program from the cyclic problems of funding constraints, i.e.,
there is no need to use program dollars and/or worry about
staying within budget. The bottom line is that it makes sense
because the stock fund receives the benefit from LECP/VECP on
the spares through lower costs so the stock fund should pay
for it. The BOSS II program and LECP concept have the ability
to increase savings and eliminate a crucial factor which often
hinders contractor participation in VE. As the program
unfolds and matures, other DOD organizations should take a
hard look at its procedures and take the necessary actions
needed to implement its philosophy. The result will be
superior VE utilization and increased savings.
F. THE FUTURE OF VALUE ENGINEERING
As communicated throughout this thesis, Value Engineering
offers great opportunities for increased contractor profits
and substantial saving for the Government in suitable
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procurement actions. The soon to be issued, revised OMB
Circular No. A-131 will reinforce the importance of VE as a
well proven cost reduction/saving program. This will lead to
increased Government emphasis and contractor involvement.
Another important evolution is the continued debate in the
House of Representatives on House Rule 133 (H.R. 133), short
title: "Systematic Application of Value Engineering Act of
1993," dated January 5, 1993, which will too increase VE
awareness. Industry is also taking an active role in
recognizing the extensive uses for VE through the actions of
the Society of American Value Engineers (SAVE).
Value Engineering should promise to be an exciting program
in the near future. It has the capacity to assist in
maintaining the industrial base during the prevailing defense
conversion drive in today's rapidly changing defense
procurement environment. In this respect, VE may be used as
a tool to assist in keeping engineers active and on the
cutting edge despite reduced procurement of new weapon
systems.
Lastly, VE can also be used, by both the contractor and
Government to influence many decisions faced in the
acquisition arena, for example; make vs buy decisions, design
to cost analysis, and analyzing the LCC of programs. It is
evident that VE has many advantages and needs to be viewed as
an outstanding cost saving technique which has many benefits
for all who properly apply it.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations
of this research effort. Value Engineering is a complex
process and requires a great deal of effort and emphasis to be
fully utilized. The primary research question of this thesis
was to determine what extent the DOD VE program is applicable
to the procurement of spare parts, and how should VE be
utilized for maximum benefit? From the results of the
research, three conclusions are made: First, VE is a proven
cost saving tool but underutilized in spare parts procurement.
To maximize savings, the VE effort should be emphasized in the
replenishment spare parts procurement process. A serious
undertaking needs to be initiated to stimulate more contractor
VE participation in the spare parts procurement process.
Second, there continues to be a lack of top management support
within the DOD for the VE program in general,-which directly
impacts on the VE investment in spare parts procurement. And
third, the current DOD procurement environment of reduced
budgets and fewer major weapon systems acquisitions leads to
a need for more emphasis of VE on the spare parts procurement
process. Based on these conclusions, recommendations are made
which offer a means to encourage more application of Value
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Engineering in the procurement of spare parts and provide
greater incentive to partake in VE in general. This chapter
closes with some suggestions for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The first conclusion is concerned with the fact that Value
Engineering is a proven cost saving tool for the Government
and contractor alike, in both major systems acquisitions and
spare parts procurement, which is however underutilized in the
spare parts procurement process. The basic VE philosophy is
simple, but the program is often difficult to execute in the
two procedures of spare parts procurement.
The primary effort of VE in spare parts procurement is
through the in-house (VEP) program. Contractor participation
is lacking. The VE effort in the spare parts procurement
process should be emphasized during the replenishment spare
parts procurement process. Opportunities for significant
savings are greatest here as opposed to the provisional
procurement process as reflected in Chapter V.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will need to become
more aggressive in using VE towards spare parts procurement as
they continue tc receive more spare parts. The new Logistics
Engineering Change Proposal (LECP) process established at the
Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in their BOSS II program
should be evaluated to determine if similar processes could be
applied throughout the entire DOD. The benefits of reduced
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processing and approval times of accepted LECPs, combined with
the change in funding procedures, could play an important
factor in enticing more contractor participation in VE
directed toward the spare parts procurement cycle.
The second conclusion relates to VE in broad terms. It is
the fact that top management support within the DOD has been
lacking throughout the history of VE. This problem must be
overcome. In order for any program to be successful it must
be perceived in a positive manner and promoted by the leaders
of the organization. It is adamant that the VE process and
concept receive top management support. Sufficient training
and allocation of funds for the VE program must be a prime
emphasis by top management. Each functional, project/program
or acquisition manager must cooperate and participate to
ensure an effective program. Until this occurs VE will
continue to produce savings well below its full capacity.
It appears that the needed policies and direction through
the various DOD directives, instructions, manuals and letters,
are in place, yet there seems to be some hesitancy to fully
apply the essential support needed to get the ball rolling in
the VE domain. To accomplish this there needs to be an
attitude shift, a recognition and acceptance that VE is a
desirable program, not just a renewed vision of an old
program. Leaders within the acquisition and contracting
profession need to promote the VE program, begin training and
educating a significant number of VE management sections, and
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establish realistic goals and objectives for VE savings. With
a truly dedicated DOD wide effort toward VE, contractors will
begin to take heed and follow our lead, thus leading to more
participation and submission of VECPs, equalling more savings.
The third conclusion addresses the current DOD procurement
environment and the need to stimulate more VE participation.
The continued budget constraints and reduced acquisitions of
major systems indicates that DOD dollars are getting tight.
The DOD needs to promote all cost saving or cost avoidance
programs which are available.
The dwindling resources impact on the contractor in a
different fashion. They must become more competitive to
receive future contract awards. To remain competitive and
acquire more contracts, contractors need to maintain strong
and active engineering programs. VE offers many opportunities
for employment of engineering personnel and is oriented toward
seeking innovative, state of the art improvements. Through VE
evaluation and improvement of spare parts, contractors will be
able to acquire more profits and also maintai-n their strong
engineering assets.
It also appears that a renewed effort for implementing the
Value Engineering philosophy will soon be forthcoming, as
history is sure to repeat itself. The issuance of a new OMB
Circular along with the current discussions ongoing in the
House of Representatives, regarding H.R. 133, will surely
refocus top level attention on the VE process. These, along
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with the continued budget constraints, will surely have an
impact on the future direction and use of the Value
Engineering program within the Department of Defense and
Government agencies in general.
C. RECOMMOENATIONS
The following recommendations are made based on the three
conclusions previously identified. These recommendations
should result in a more energetic VE program in spare parts
procurement and major systems acquisitions within the DOD
procurement environment.
1. In an attempt to improve contractor participation and
also assist top management in committing to the VE program,
the VE community and advocates should embark on an all out
education and training program. Training and education should
begin at the top and proceed to the lowest working levels and
must include both Government and contractor personnel. The
process will take a significant amount of energy and time but
when completed it should benefit all involved. The goal of
this plan should be to institute a cultural change and
acceptance of the VE program throughout the acquisition
profession.
2. The dollar threshold for mandatory inclusion of VE
clauses should be increased through legislation from the
current FAR requirement of contracts greater than $100,000 to
$1,000,000. The change would eliminate one of the primary
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impediments cited by Government executives and VE personnel by
eliminating any potential "defective pricing" concerns as
mentioned in Chapter V. The VE clause would no longer be
viewed as just another mandated requirement, as often is the
case in small contacts. The million dollar figure would place
VE emphasis on 77 percent of the total acquisition dollars
obligated as was seen in Table 2. This change would also
allow Government program/acquisition managers to focus VE use
on a smaller total number of contracts as was also identified
in Chapter V.
The change would however have a catch to it, in the sense
that a new policy or procedure would need to be incorporated
into the FAR to accept unsolicited VECPs from contracts below
the $1,000,000 dollar figure. By creating this new policy,
the Government would still allow the lesser dollar contract
awardees to take part in the VE program.
3. To truly stimulate participation in Value Engineering
in general, it is proposed that a system be designed where by
the savings generated through the VE program are not all
categorized as savings and totally recovered by the
Government. It is necessary to consider a new method of VE
program funding which allows a percentage of the savings
generated to be retained by the Government VE activity
creating the savings. This type of funding philosophy follows
the same principles established by ASO in their BOSS II
program, which appears to be quite successful.
70
Assume it could be agreed that 10 percent of the savings
generated could be retained by the VE organization. The
result of this approach in 1992 would have allowed DLA and
NAVSUP to recover $7.9 million and $500,000 dollars
respectively. A policy of this nature should allow the
activity, progrZan, or agency to reallocate the additional
dollars reclaimed through the VE savings as they see fit.
Most likely a majority of this money would be kept by the VE
agency and invested in maintaining or improving the VE
program. These dollars could be used for additional personnel
or procurement of new state of the art hardware such as
computer programs and systems, i.e., Computer Aided
Manufacturing (CAM), Computer Aided Design (CAD), and Computer
Aided Logistics (CAL) systems. As a result of these purchases
and enhancements the entire VE program will improve. The VE
funding policy should no longer rely on a simple capped budget
ceilings for VE programs, as in the past. The proposed
funding approach would provide a strong incentive for VE
participation; people will and do respond to- incentives of
this nature, i.e., dollars.
4. To augment this effort, public recognition of VE
achievements needs to be emphasized for both DOD and
contractor performance. Acknowledgment similar to that of the
Ford Quality program of recent years is a prime example of how
public recognition and praise can improve quality and support.
Also, the DLA VE program is quite active in this area and
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could be used as a model for other programs. Public
acknowledgment is a very effective motivator and could pay
great dividends for improving the whole VE program.
5. As noted in Chapter V, there must be a stronger effort
of VE in the earlier phases of the acquisition process for
major systems. VE should begin in phase I, Demonstration and
Validation (DEMVAL) instead of the current guidance of
initiating it during Engineering & Manufacturing Development
(EMD). The purpose of this change is to incorporate VE with
the production engineering and productibility efforts which
starts at DEMVAL, and continue it through the production and
development phase. The earlier use of the VE function would
benefit the entire acquisition process, including spare parts
procurement.
Implementation of these recommendations will reflect the
seriousness that the Government feels about the Value
Engineering program and its potential. Defense contractors
will then become more active in the DOD VE program.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Based on the research effort conducted foi this thesis,
the following areas relating to Value Engineering and spare
parts procurement are suggested for further research:
1. Conduct a survey with twenty-five of the DLA top ten
percent dollar contractors who have been involved with the
Value Engineering program in recent years. The focus of the
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survey should be directed at determining what their current
attitude is concerning the DOD VE program?, What are the
prevailing problems associated with the program that deters
participation?, and How can we change the system to prompt
more contractor participation?
2. Since VE is only one of many techniques for cost
reduction/savings, a study should be conducted to determine if
the various programs (Reverse Engineering, "Break-out",
Should/Could Cost Analysis, Spares Acquisition Integrated with
Production (SAIP)) are collectively forming an effective and
comprehensive effort at reducing costs. These programs may be
found to be duplicative in nature, competing against one
another for scarce resources, resulting in an overall
inefficient cost saving effort.
3. Compare and contrast the DOD in-house VE program with
the DOD VE program for contractors to determine why the in-
house effort is so much more productive in regards to VE
application for spare parts procurement. There is little
information available of how the two interface and this
research may provide some useful insight into how the DOD VE
program might be best structured.
The bottom line objective of the DOD VE program is to
motivate contractors to practice Value Engineering and to
entice them to submit VECPs resulting in cost savings which
they partake in through the established share ratios. This is
a large and complex topic and it is difficult to touch on
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every relevant issue that is associated with VE. The research
effort put forth in this study should shed some light on the
fact that Value Engineering is a powerful tool within the
acquisition profession, for all forms of procurement, which
still has yet to reach full implementation and potential.
In summary, with the current economic situation in
industry (downsizing) and DOD budget cuts, it seems important
that every possible cost reduction program be looked at for
better and stronger implementation. Enlightened awareness of
Value Engineering should be a key element in the DOD overall
approach to improving productivity and reducing acquisition





1. ohat are the published standard operating procedures for
applying Value Engineering to spare parts procurement?
2. What are the key elements that are looked for in
deciding whether the spare part has potential for VE
application?
3. Are both realistic goals and reasonable incentives set?
4. Is proper recognition or awards given for achieving
significant savings?
5. Has the VE program been allotted sufficient funds,
office space, people, and equipment?
6. Is there an interrelationship between VE and
reliability, quality control, purchasing, etc.?
7. Who are the key players in the VE program and is it
organized efficiently?
8. Are there periodic audits of the VE function/process?
9. How can we better improve or involve contractor
participation in VE in spare parts acquisition?
10. Is there a VE training program in place? (Duration, who
and number of personnel annually trained)
11. Are accurate costs of parts, processes, material, labor,
and all other factors available?
12. When in the part life-cycle or supported system life-
cycle is VE accomplished?
13. What are the problems involved in the VE effori in spare
parts acquisition?
14. Is the use of a decision-making model or checklist used
and if so what are it's key factors?
15. Please provide any additional comments or suggestions
for improving VE use in the acquisition of spare parts.
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APPENDIX B
Sam4le Value EngineerinQ Saving Proco-_
ORIGINAL CONTRACT AGREEMENT:
Navy to purchase 50,000 units at $200.00 each
Total Contract Price $10,000,000
Production Cost - $ 9,000,000
CONTRACTOR PROFIT $ 1,000,000
CONTRACTOR SUBMITS A VECP:
VECP results in a new unit cost of $150.00 each, thus
resulting in a $50.00 sa--ings per unit.
This VECP will affect the second half of the production
run for this contract; a total of 25,000 units.
Contract Savings $ 1,250,000 ($50 x 25,000)
Developmental Costs - $ 50,000 (Contractor)
IFSTANT CONTRACT SAVINGS $ 1,200,000
Implementation Costs - $ 50,000 (Government)
NET ACQUISITION SAVINGS $ 1,150,000
Assume the Share Ratio for this contract is 50;50.
Contractor Share $ 575,000 ($1.15M x .50)
New Contract Price + $ 8,800,000 ($10M - $1.2M)
AMENDED CONTRACT PRICE $ 9,375,7000
The Government recognizes a net savings of $625,000 from
the VECP ($10,000,000 - $ 9,375,000).
How does the VECP impact upon the contractor, both in
savings and profit margin?
New Contract Price $ 9,375,000
New Production Costs - $ 7,750,000 ($9M - $1.25M)
NEW CONTRACTOR PROFIT $ 1,625,000
THE CONTRACTOR PROFIT MARGIN INCREASES FROM 10% TO 16.25%
BASED ON THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT AGREEMENT.
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Additional profits can be generated from concurrent and
future contract savings as well. This page will address
these areas.
To continue with this example, assume the following
savings are also generated as a result of the contractors
submission of the VECP.
Concurrent Savings $ 2,000,000
Future Savings (3YRS) + $ 7,000,000
TOTAL ADDITIONAL SAVINGS $ 9,000,000
These additional savings can be generated as a result of
the "Break-Out" process, Reverse Engineering, or just
plain old competition, whereby other contractors are
producing items that are effected by the
submission/acceptance of the VECP.
Contractor Share $ 4,500,000 ($9M x .50)
New Contract Price + $ 9,375,000 (Original
Contract)
TOTAL GOVERNMENT COSTS $13,875,000
New Production Costs $ 7,750,000 (Original
Contract)
FINAL CONTRACTOR PROFIT $ 6,125,000
There needs to be some cautionary remarks made concerning
this extremely rosy picture portrayed here, e.g. the more than
600 percent increase in profit to be recognized by the
contractor for his VECP. First, concurrent contracts are not
awarded as frequently as their treatment in the FAR might
suggest. Second, the contractor may opt for settling future
savings via the negotiation of a "lump sum" payment, which
might be considerably lower than waiting for the three years
to collect on contracts which are impacted by the VECP. Also,
the VE process is not a risk free adventure, if a VECP is
rejected by the Government then the contractor is unable to
recoup any of their developmental costs and thus these
expenses must be absorbed through the loss of profit dollar.
Again remember, rejection of a VECP is not disputable.
Source: NAVSUP VE Contractor Brief, November 1989 [Ref. 51].
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APPEDIX C
DOD VE STATISTICAL DATA
FISCAL YEARS 1989-1992
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VE Worksheet FY 1989
In-House Contractor














Total In-House $1,231,051,405 26:1
Total Contractor $216,769,883 7:1
Full-time FTE





>8 hrs <8 hrs








5. Props rec'd USA In-House 556 588
Contractor 592 496
USN In-House 4,569 1,895
Contractor 277 161
USAF In-House 430 200
Contractor 196 116
DLA In-House 2214 1,972
Contractor 108 43
Total In-House 7,769 4,655
Total Contractor 1,173 816
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VE Worksheet FY 1990













Total In-House $1,201,899,000 29 :1
Total Contractor $242,573,018 10 :1













5. Props rec'd USAF In-House 444 276
Contractor 236 157
USA In-House 377 534
Contractor 478 346
USN In-House 4,646 1,928
Contractor 140 88
DLA In-House 1,882 2,196
Contractor 75 44
Total In-House 7,349 4,934
Total Contractor 929 635
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VE Worksheet FY 1991
In-House Contractor














Total In-House $699,466,988 23.2 :1
Total Contractor $398,685,520 2.80 :1
Full-time FTE





>8 hrs <8 hrs








5. Props recd USA In-House 355 494
Contractor 338 196
USN In-House 2,466 1,098
Contractor 122 76
USAF In-House 134 52
Contractor 172 124
DLA In-House 8,186 3,502
Contractor 40 24
Total In-House 11,141 5,146
Total Contractor 672 420
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VE Worksheet FY 1992
In-House Contractor














Total In-House $750,438,603 14.6 :1
Total Contractor $319,888,118 3.13 :1
Full-time FTE





>8 hrs <8 hrs








5. Props recd USA In-House 269 464
Contractor 369 224
USN In-House 1.279 459
Contractor 495 101
USAF In-House 117 77
Conitractor 65 52
DLA In-House 6,774 3,401
Contractor 35 15
Total In-House 8,439 4,401
Total Contractor 964 392
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APPENDIX D
NAVAL AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE (ASO)
LOGISTICS ENGINEER CHANGE PROPOSAL (LECP) PROCEDURES
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